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Whereas in basic research, intuition has become a topic of great interest, clinical
research and depression research in specific have not applied to the topic of intuition,
yet. This is astonishing because a well-known phenomenon during depression is that
patients have difficulties to judge and decide. In contrast to healthy individuals who
take most daily life decisions intuitively (Kahneman, 2011), depressed individuals seem
to have difficulties to come to fast and adaptive decisions. The current article pursues
three goals. First, our aim is to establish the hypothesis that intuition is impaired in
depression against the background of influential theoretical accounts as well as empirical
evidence from basic and clinical research. The second aim of the current paper is to
provide explanations for recent findings on the depression-intuition interplay and to
present directions for future research that may help to broaden our understanding of
decision difficulties in depression. Third, we seek to propose ideas on how therapeutic
interventions can support depressed individuals in taking better decisions. Even though
our knowledge regarding this topic is still limited, we will tentatively launch the idea that
an important first step may be to enhance patients’ access to intuitions. Overall, this
paper seeks to introduce the topic of intuition to clinical research on depression and to
hereby set the stage for upcoming theory and practice.
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INTRODUCTION
In many situations, individuals judge and decide without long reflections about the problem at
hand. Despite the lack of long deliberation, the decisional and judgmental outcomes are often
smart and satisfactory (Gigerenzer, 2007). In other words, we sometimes know what is right even
if, we cannot explain why. In many situations, this is because, we use our intuition. Even though
intuition is a cognitive capacity that influences many decisions and subsequent actions in daily
life (Kahneman, 2011), it has received little attention so far within clinical research on cognitive
processes and decision-making in depression. This seems unfortunate because individuals with
depression often report to have difficulties to come to decisions (American Psychiatric Association
[APA], 2013). Converging with its preceding versions, the fifth edition of the Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5) includes indecisiveness as a diagnostic criterion
for Major Depressive Disorder (American Psychiatric Association [APA], 2013). A question that
may follow from this often reported phenomenon is whether intuitive decision-making is impaired
during depression. Research on this hypothesis, however, is scarce.
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AIMS OF THE CURRENT PAPER
The current paper addresses three objectives. Our first aim is to
develop the hypothesis that intuition is impaired in depression
and that considering intuition in the scope of depression research
may have important theoretical and practical consequences.
The second aim of the article is to point to methodological
issues and open questions. Against the background of novel
findings on the depression-intuition interplay, we will propose
directions for future research and specific ideas as to how research
on intuition may broaden our knowledge regarding decision
difficulties in depression. The third aim of the current paper is to
adopt a practical and therapeutical point of view by addressing
the question how decision-making of depressed patients may
be enhanced. Given that the overall knowledge regarding the
interplay between depression and intuition is still limited, we will
raise novel questions rather than giving concluding answers on
this topic and hereby seek to set the stage for future research.
DECISION-MAKING DURING
DEPRESSION
When facing a decision, patients suffering from an acute episode
of Major Depression often cannot make up their mind what
to do. The depressive mind is narrowed to a tunnel vision in
which patients tend to circle around the same (negative) pieces of
information. This processing style is called rumination (Nolen-
Hoeksema et al., 2008; Lyubomirsky et al., 2015). Rumination
means to repetitively over-think the causes and consequences
of one’s situation or mood state (Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008).
It has been shown that a ruminative self-focus predicts and
prolongs depression and that it impairs problem solving (see
Lyubomirsky et al., 2015 for a review). Thus, rumination may
interfere with intuitive processes as it fosters a narrow and
analytical information processing style (Watkins and Teasdale,
2004).
Research has shown that depressed individuals take poor
decisions (Leykin and DeRubeis, 2010) or no decision at all
(Okwumabua et al., 2003) – a phenomenon they severely suffer
from American Psychiatric Association [APA] (2013). Moreover,
it has been shown that depressive symptomatology is significantly
associated with reduced search for information (Leykin et al.,
2011). Individuals with higher levels of depression further
report that ambiguities and uncertainties remain unresolved after
they take a decision (Leykin et al., 2011). Furthermore, higher
levels of depression are associated with reduced perception of
existing resources (e.g., assistance of other people; own talents)
and reduced satisfaction with decisions (Leykin et al., 2011).
Individuals with depression have a high risk to feel uncertain
about decisions they have taken (Stacey et al., 2008). Moreover,
depressed individuals report more anticipatory regret (Schwartz
et al., 2002; Monroe et al., 2005). Whereas anticipatory regret
may serve as a warning mechanism that protects a person from
bad decisions (McCormack et al., 2015) it seems that depressed
individuals experience such high levels of anticipatory regret that
this results in passivity and inaction. In line with this, depressed
patients report to have less confidence and self-esteem regarding
their decision-making capacities (Leykin and DeRubeis, 2010)
and tend to take decisions that have had negative outcomes
previously (Leykin et al., 2011). Thus, patients with depression
seem to have difficulties to learn from prior decision-making
experiences and tend to use maladaptive strategies repeatedly.
The above-mentioned shows that decision-making during
depression seems to be aﬄicted with difficulties. The question,
which component of decision-making is impaired during
depression remains open. It should be noted that there are
a number of factors that may be related to decision-making
difficulties such as impaired reasoning capacities in depression
(Radenhausen and Anker, 1988; Sedek and von Hecker, 2004;
Perham and Rosser, 2012; Jung et al., 2014), lacking appreciation
of information (Hindmarch et al., 2013) or limitations in
working memory capacities (Channon and Baker, 1994) and
increased ruminative processes (Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008).
However, in the following, we aim to address the topic of
potentially impaired intuitive processes because intuition is an
important and – amongst healthy samples – often used decision-
making tool (Gigerenzer, 2007; Kahneman, 2011) with highly
adaptive features, especially in personally relevant, complex
decision making situations (Kuhl, 2001; Topolinski and Strack,
2009a).
WHAT IS INTUITION?
Since researchers investigate decision-making and judgment,
there has been a fascination for the topic of intuition. Ancient
philosophers used the term nous (greek: noein) to refer to the
ability of human beings to grasp what is real or true. Nous (or
noesis) is often translated with ‘good sense’ or ‘intuition’ and it
stands in contrast to rational, conscious reasoning. In this ancient
definition, intuition is understood as a vehicle by which one can
get aware of what one already knows. As such, it may allow people
to get access to pre-existing knowledge. Intuition further received
considerable attention in the scope of psychoanalysis. Jung (1921)
conceptualized intuition as a means by which a person can see the
bigger picture. According to Jung (1921), intuition strives for new
possibilities in what is objectively given. Intuition is the vehicle
that automatically operates as soon as no other psychological
function is able to find a way out of a complex situation (Jung,
1921). Along this line, for Jung, intuition is about discovering – a
facet that still applies to current conceptions of intuition (Bowers
et al., 1990).
Modern social and cognitive psychology operationalize
intuition as a specific product in which puzzle pieces are quickly
put together. Intuitions result from information processes that
operate fast, associative and unconsciously (Kahneman, 2011).
Prior experiences and their mental representations, build the
basis for intuitive judgments and decisions. Thus, operating
like a pattern completion mechanism, it appears that intuitive
judgments are related to prior learning experiences and arise
through unconscious holistic spreading processes (Sadler-Smith,
2008). They are often experienced as if they had come out of
nowhere and enable individuals to detect coherences and patterns
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(Kahneman and Klein, 2009). Intuitions are typically described
with the phenomenon of knowing something without knowing
how (Epstein, 2010).
In order to directly elicit and measure intuition in the
laboratory, researchers developed paradigms such as the
semantic coherence task, a well-established experimental
paradigm developed by Bowers et al. (1990). In the semantic
coherence task intuition is operationalized as the sudden
perception or realization of coherence based on unconscious
activation spread within associative networks (Bolte et al., 2003;
Bolte and Goschke, 2005). During the task, participants see triads
of words. Each word triad consists of three words, presented in
a stacked format on a computer screen. Participants are asked
to judge intuitively whether the presented word triad shares
a common denominator (e.g., SALT DEEP FOAM; all words
are associated to the solution concept SEA; coherent triad) or
whether the triad consists of randomly selected words (DREAM
BALL BOOK; no common denominator; incoherent triad).
The intuitive performance is reflected by the degree to which
participants can differentiate between coherent and incoherent
word triads without being able to explicitly name the solution
word (which would be indicative for insight and not intuition;
Bolte and Goschke, 2005; Topolinski and Strack, 2009a,b,c;
Topolinski and Reber, 2010). It has been shown that healthy
participants are generally able to detect semantic coherence
above chance level (Bolte and Goschke, 2005). They know when
a triad is coherent, without being able to explicitly name the
underlying solution word. This is even shown in experimental
designs, in which participants have less than 3 s for their decision,
a time window during which the operation of explicit processes
is very unlikely (Bolte and Goschke, 2005). Thus, the semantic
coherence task operationalizes and measures intuition by
assessing the activation of information (solution word) which is
not consciously accessible (Bolte et al., 2003; Bolte and Goschke,
2005).
According to the continuous model (Bowers et al., 1990),
intuitions arise from a gradual two-stage process. Within the first
stage, information spreads and accumulates. This results in the
activation of an associated network. Because of its activation,
the mnemonic network is processed more fluently (Topolinski
and Strack, 2009a,c), which in turn is accompanied by subtle
positive affective changes (Topolinski and Strack, 2009a,c for
empirical demonstrations of processing fluency). It is during this
first stage, the guiding stage, when a person may experience the
feeling of coherence – an intuition (Bowers et al., 1990). If the
unconscious activation spread of coherent information exceeds
a certain threshold the initial intuitive feeling of coherence
may evolve into the explicit representation of the solution. This
second stage, in which a person can explicitly reason about the
decision or action taken within the guiding stage, is called the
integrative stage (see Zander et al., 2015 showing distinct brain
activation patterns for each stage of the intuition generation
process).
The theoretical conception of a continuous two-stage progress
from intuition to explicit insight, allows us to hypothesize at
which stage impairments may occur in individuals who have little
intuitive capacities. For example, the inability to take decisions
based on intuitive processing may be attributable to impairments
at very early stages of the intuition generation process, such
as reduced spreading activation within the semantic networks.
However, it is also conceivable that intuitive impairments may
occur because individuals are not able to make use of subtle
positive affective cues, normally elicited by coherence perception
(Topolinski and Strack, 2009a,b). On a later stage, it may be that
an individual has the intuition but does not use it because of low
confidence in his or her decisional abilities. Overall, it becomes
clear that the conceptualization of intuition generation as a
two-stage process may have important consequences regarding
further theorizing.
THE ADVANTAGES OF INTUITION
For a long time, intuition was the black box of modern
experimental psychology (Catty and Halberstadt, 2008) and
initial research programs in this field focused on instances in
which non-deliberate, heuristic problem solving strategies lead
to erroneous and suboptimal outcomes (Tversky and Kahneman,
1974). However, within the past decades, research on potential
advantages of intuitive decision-making has received particular
attention. Studies in the scope of the Naturalistic Decision
Making Paradigm (Klein, 1998, 2008), for example, demonstrated
that subjects from various professional backgrounds such as
firefighters, doctors, chess players, nurses, and judges use their
intuition in complex situations and under high stress and time
pressure. Especially in situations in which rational-analytical
processing is not possible (e.g., under stress or uncertainty)
and in case of high experience with the problem at hand,
intuitions can lead to impressively adaptive outcomes. When
large amounts of information need to be encoded, intuitive
decisions bear better outcomes and lead to more diagnostic
judgments than extensive reasoning. A vivid demonstration of
this has been shown by Betsch et al. (2001). In their study,
participants were given large amounts of information concerning
the numerical increases and decreases of five hypothetical shares.
Seventy-five units of information were briefly presented on a
computer screen. Even though participants could not explicitly
tell what, for example, the average money returns were, they
had developed a gut feeling of what the best and worst options
were.
Subsequent studies bolstered the idea that relying on intuitive
hunches is especially useful when the problem at hand is
complex in nature (Dijksterhuis, 2004; Dijksterhuis and van
Olden, 2006; see also Wilson and Schooler, 1991; Topolinski
and Strack, 2008) and that deliberate processes such as searching
for solutions or memorizing may even impair decision-making
performance (Topolinski and Strack, 2008). Also in the context
of social cognition, intuition has received considerable attention
(Lieberman, 2000). Studies that operationalized intuition with the
semantic coherence task found that intuitive processing seems
to be especially relevant for the enactment of affiliation motives
(Maldei et al., under review) and that intuitive performance
is positively associated with meaning in life (Hicks et al.,
2010).
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Moreover, it has been shown that people are also more
satisfied with decisions that were based on their gut feeling.
In their seminal study, Wilson et al. (1993) let participants
choose a poster that they could take home. Subjects could choose
either intuitively or after thinking through the reasons why they
liked or disliked each alternative. Results revealed that subjects
in the rational-reasoning condition were less satisfied with
their choice when asked about 3 weeks after the experimental
session compared to subjects who chose a poster intuitively.
Reduced levels of satisfaction in the analytical group may have
occurred because analytic processing typically abstracts from
the emotional and personal meaning of a decision at hand
(Kuhl et al., 2015). In other words, analytic processes reduce the
complexity of a problem by breaking ambiguous information
down to one aspect that is important in a particular situation
(Dijksterhuis, 2004; Kuhl et al., 2015). This is of advantage for
logical problem solving but of disadvantage when the problem
includes divergent aspects that need to be considered (e.g.,
solving a complex personal problem; interpersonal relationships;
dealing with an illness; see Kuhl et al., 2015). For the
latter problem type, intuitive decision-making seems to be
advantageous.
Also in the context of personality psychology intuitions
that are based on holistic and associative processing sequences
are conceived as highly adaptive. More specifically, Personality
Systems Interaction Theory (PSI; Kuhl, 2000, 2001), distinguishes
between low-level and high-level intuitions. Low-level intuitions
help people to execute concrete actions and typically arise
under high levels of positive affect (Kuhl, 2001). They are
guided by a system called intuitive behavior control. One of
the ontogenetically earliest observation of such processes is the
automatic imitation and contagion of emotional expressions
in newborn children (Meltzoff and Moore, 1994). So whereas
low-level intuitions help to implement intentions and to enact
automatized behavioral programs, high-level intuitions derive
from what PSI theory calls extension memory, a system that
stores all experiences of a person and that integrates new
information (Kuhl, 2001; Kuhl et al., 2015; see Lieberman
et al., 2004 for neuropsychological evidence for intuition-
based self-knowledge). The extension memory operates on
the basis of unconsciously operating processes of activation
spread, which enable a person to effortlessly include a vast
amount of information regarding experiences, needs and goals
simultaneously into the decision-making process (Kuhl et al.,
2015). Thus, high-level intuitions are conceptualized as feelings
or hunches in which diverging aspects of the self can be
integrated. Intuitions help people to reconcile many – maybe
even conflicting – aspects of a decision at hand and lead hereby
to adaptive and helpful outcomes even when a person has not
explicitly thought about all relevant aspects.
Altogether, the foregoing illustrates that the ability to make use
of high-level intuitive processes may lead to adaptive outcomes in
complex situations and connects us to ourselves in an integrated
manner. In the following, we will thus further elaborate our
main assumption of impaired intuition in depression by referring
to influential theoretical accounts and empirical demonstrations
from basic psychology.
THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL
INDICATIONS FOR IMPAIRED INTUITION
IN DEPRESSION
Even though – normally – intuitions guide us through every-day
life, there seem to be psychological states in which individuals are
less intuitive and therefore less able to come adaptive decisions
without long reflections. On the one hand, research has focused
on external factors intuitive processes may depend on, such
as time pressure or complexity of the problem (Klein, 1998,
2008). On the other hand, there are intra-individual conditions
under which it is more or less likely that people will use their
intuition. The question is thus, within which psychological states
people easily decide intuitively and when they are blocked and
unable to decide out of the belly. Because Major Depression is
an affective disorder that is most and foremost characterized
sustained negative mood, we will refer to empirical evidence from
basic research on the interplay between mood and cognition in
order to consolidate our assumptions in the following.
Intuition and Mood
Regarding the question how people’s intuitive capacities are
associated with their current mood state, considerations
originating from affect-as-information-theory (Schwarz, 2002)
and broaden-and-build theory (Fredrickson, 2001) provide
important insights. According to these accounts, associative,
flexible information processes needed for intuitions to develop,
are more likely to operate under positive mood. Indeed, it has
been shown that positive mood makes individuals find unusual
(but reasonable) associations and fosters categorizations of
material in a more flexible manner (Isen, 2001). The effects of
positive mood on problem solving, flexibility and innovation
are observable in a broad field of settings and among various
populations (Isen, 2001). Most importantly for the current
thrust, it has robustly been found that positive mood fosters
the activation of remote semantic associations (Isen et al., 1985,
1987; Estrada et al., 1994; Fredrickson and Branigan, 2005) and
that participants’ intuitive coherence judgments benefit from
positive mood (Bolte et al., 2003; Balas et al., 2012). In addition,
being in a positive mood makes it more probable to make use of
feelings and intuitive hunches in the decision-making process
(see affect-as information theory; Schwarz and Clore, 2007).
Converging with this, there are several studies showing that
individuals are more likely to rely on their intuitions when they
are in a positive mood (Bless et al., 1990; Elsbach and Barr,
1999; Ruder and Bless, 2003; King et al., 2007) and intuitions
themselves are accompanied by subtle positive affective cues
(Topolinski and Strack, 2009a). Thus, positive mood enlarges our
thought-action repertoire, widens the associative field and makes
us consider more and new information (Csikszentmihalyi, 1990).
As a result, individuals approach and explore their environment
during positive mood states and consequently engage in activities
(Diener and Diener, 1996; Fredrickson, 2001).
Negative mood states, in contrast, signal that the environment
is problematic. This in turn narrows the thought-action
repertoire (Fredrickson, 2001). Consequently, more analytical
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and systematic decision-making approaches are selected and
flexible processing needed for intuitions to develop are inhibited.
In line with this, affect-as-information theory (Schwarz, 2002),
posits that negative mood states such as sadness foster cognitive
analytic reasoning which makes individuals attend to few details
rather than the bigger picture. Thus, whereas positive affectivity
cues top-down processes, negative affectivity prompts bottom-
up, data-driven and item specific processing (Clore et al., 2001;
Clore and Storbeck, 2006). Converging with this, an influential
study showed that in happy moods, participants match geometric
figures on the basis of global similarities whereas in sad moods,
subjects tend to match figures on the basis of local similarities
(Gasper and Clore, 2002). Consequently, it is assumed that
intuitive processes are impaired during negative mood states,
because negative mood fosters analytic reasoning. Baumann and
Kuhl (2002) investigated the interplay between intuition, affect
and affect regulation ability and found that intuitions of semantic
coherence were impaired by negative affect in participants who
reported to have difficulties to down-regulate negative mood
states. In contrast, intuitive performance was not impaired by
negative mood in participants who were generally successful in
down-regulating negative affective states (Baumann and Kuhl,
2002).
From a clinical perspective those findings are worth noting, as
one of the main features of psychological disorders and especially
Major Depression is the sustained experience of negative
affectivity as well as the inability to down-regulate dysphoric
mood states. Thus, enduring states of negative affectivity as
well as the inability to experience positive affective states may
be aspects of depression that inhibit open and flexible ways of
processing information needed for intuition. To summarize, the
assumption of impaired intuitive processing during depression is
substantiated from several different theoretical perspectives.
Depression and Intuition: Preliminary
Findings
In the following, we will present three recent studies that
have empirically tested the hypothesis of impaired intuition in
depression. We will outline the study designs as well as findings
of these three studies. Moreover, we will critically discuss the
pattern of results and will then conclude which future studies
should be done in order to further elucidate the interplay
between depression and intuitive decision-making. The first
study that has investigated intuition in depression (Remmers
et al., 2015a) compared the intuitive performance of depressed
inpatients (n = 29) to a healthy control sample (n = 27).
Both samples were comparable in terms of gender distribution,
while the depressed sample being slightly younger than the
control group. To assess intuition, the well-established intuition
measure described above, namely the semantic coherence task,
was used. Results revealed that depressed inpatients were less able
to detect semantic coherence than healthy control participants.
In addition, depressed patients who fulfilled criterion A8 of
the DSM-5 (American Psychiatric Association [APA], 2013),
reflecting patients’ difficulties to think, concentrate and decide,
had significantly lower intuitive accuracy than patients without
those symptoms. Thus, this first study on intuitive performance
during depression supported the hypothesis of impaired intuition
in depressed patients.
Two follow-up studies aimed to replicate the finding that
semantic coherence intuitions are impaired in depression and to
generalize this finding to another intuition measure. In their first
study, Remmers et al. (2016a) used a sample of depressed patients
(N = 39) from a day-clinic. To replicate the finding of impaired
semantic coherence detection, patients’ severity of depressive
symptoms measured with the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI-
II, Beck et al., 1996) was correlated with their performance
in the semantic coherence task. To generalize the impairment
in intuitive processing to another intuition measure, patients
further completed the visual coherence task (Bowers et al., 1990;
Bolte and Goschke, 2008; Topolinski and Strack, 2009c) which is
similar to the semantic coherence task because it operationalizes
intuition as fast, non-analytical coherence detection. However,
the tasks differ in terms of stimulus type as in the visual
coherence task participants see blurred pictures (instead of word
triads presented in the semantic coherence task). One half of
the stimulus pool is coherent because it contains distorted
meaningful but very rarely explicitly identified pictures. For the
other half of the stimuli the pixel information of the coherent
pictures is rotated to such a degree that no meaningful gestalt is
preserved. Thus, coherent as well as incoherent pictures contain
the same pixel information but they differ in their arrangement.
During the task, subjects are asked to judge whether the presented
picture is coherent (depicting a real object) or incoherent
(depicting no object). Similar to the semantic coherence task,
it has been shown that participants are able to differentiate
between coherent and incoherent pictures without being able
to explicitly name the depicted pictures (Bowers et al., 1990).
In their study, Remmers et al. (2016a) found in line with the
study of Remmers et al. (2015a) that higher levels of depression
were associated with less intuitive accuracy in the semantic
coherence task. However, findings regarding the visual coherence
task were against the initial hypothesis. Patients with higher levels
of depression showed enhanced ability to detect visual coherence.
Notably, there was a near zero correlation between the two
intuition measures across the sample.
In order to explore the unexpected finding that visual
coherence detection is enhanced in patients with higher levels
of depression, the authors conducted a second study in which
they compared the performance in the visual coherence task
of depressed inpatients (n = 27) to a matched healthy control
sample (n = 30). Similar to the study design of Remmers et al.
(2015a), the diagnostic status of subjects was determined with
the SCID interview. Results revealed that depressed patients
did not only perform as good as healthy subjects, but that
they outperformed the healthy control sample in discriminating
coherent from incoherent blurred pictures. Granted that both
measures assess the same construct namely intuition (see
discussion on this below), it may tentatively be concluded that
that for depressed individuals, processes underlying visual and
semantic coherence detection are distinct from each other and
that only language-based semantic intuitions seem to be impaired
in depression. Visual coherence detection in contrast seems to
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profit from depressed mood. However, given the preliminary
nature of these results future research should replicate these
findings before drawing firm conclusions.
How to Explain Detrimental and
Beneficial Aspects of Intuition during
Depression?
The novel dissociation between semantic and visual coherence
intuitions during depression raises questions regarding the
differential decisional consequences of depression and regarding
the construct validity of intuition measures. Even though it has
previously been postulated that successful performance in the
semantic as well as in the visual coherence task results from
equivalent processes, this assumption needs further investigation.
For example, the near zero correlation between the semantic
intuition index and the visual intuition index in Remmers et al.
(2016a) raises doubts to whether both tasks measure the same
construct. Furthermore, the deleterious effect of negative mood
on coherence intuitions has only been shown for semantic
coherence intuitions so far (Baumann and Kuhl, 2002).
Specific stimulus features and the processes needed for
successful performance may explain the dissociation between
depressed patients’ performance in the semantic and visual
coherence tasks. A core difference between the two tasks used in
Remmers et al. (2016a) is that one is based on visual processing
whereas the other requires language-based, semantic processing.
It has been assumed that – despite this difference in stimulus
type – the two tasks measure the same construct, namely
intuitive coherence detection (e.g., Topolinski and Strack, 2009a).
However, the current pattern of findings regarding this capacity
during depression suggests that the differences outweigh the
commonalities between the tasks – at least as far as individuals
with depression are concerned.
First, the finding that language-based intuitions are impaired,
whereas visual intuitions are not, may be related to empirical
evidence showing that biased responses in implicit memory tasks
are only consistently found in depression for tasks that require
processing of the meaning of stimuli (Watkins, 2002). Implicit
memory tasks that require the attention to perceptual features,
in contrast, are not biased during depression. Referring these
findings to the results in Remmers et al. (2016a) it may thus
be that particularly semantic coherence intuitions are impaired,
as they require semantic meaning processing, whereas blurred
pictures in the visual coherence task, do not and are therefore
intact.
Along this, line, studies using magnetoencephalography
(MEG) to investigate neural mechanisms underlying intuitive
coherence perception are worth noting in elaborating the
idea that semantic and visual coherence intuitions may be
distinguished regarding underlying mechanisms and processes
needed for successful performance. Horr et al. (2015) found that
the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) serves as a crucial integrator of
incomplete stimulus input for semantic as well visual intuitions.
However, there seems to be a striking difference in terms of
temporal dynamics. Whereas in visual coherence detection, the
OFC is one of the earliest regions that showed differential
activation (Horr et al., 2014), OFC activation was comparably
delayed in semantic intuition. In line with the foregoing, the
authors point to conceptual difference between the two tasks.
Visual coherence intuitions are specific to one sensory domain
and based on low-level stimulus features which can directly be
integrated by the OFC to a coarse holistic representation of the
pixel information. In contrast, for semantic coherence intuitions,
higher-level semantic processing needs to take place prior or
parallel to the spreading activation process that signals coherence
or incoherence, because each word of the word triad itself is a
meaningful concept that needs encoding, respectively (Horr et al.,
2015).
Furthermore, the dissociation between semantic and visual
intuitions in depression may be related to the phenomenon
that patients with depression tend to get caught in circles
of rumination (see Watkins and Teasdale, 2004). Rumination
operates largely language-based and it may be suspected that
during depression the language-based processing mode is under
high loads which may become evident in poor performance in
tasks that require this capacity.
Another important task-specific particularity that should be
discussed is that the detection of a Gestalt in the visual coherence
task requires the isolation of an object within a stimulus. As such,
successful performance in the visual coherence task requires that
subjects attend to what is already there (the object within the
blurred picture). From the angle of PSI theory this process may be
assigned to what Kuhl (2000) calls the object recognition system.
Importantly, this system is specialized in isolating elements
from the context. It benefits from negative mood and fosters
analytic-detailed processing on the one hand, but impairs holistic
processing and self-compatibility checking on the other hand
(Kazén et al., 2014). In line with this, it has been shown that
subjects with emotion regulation difficulties are better to detect
spelling errors in words (detail-oriented attention; isolating
elements from the context) when they are in a negative mood
compared to subjects who do not have difficulties in emotion-
regulation (Kazén et al., 2014). In the semantic coherence task
subjects focus on what is there, too: the three words written
on the screen. However, in contrast to the object within the
blurred picture in the visual coherence task, which is present
during the task, the solution word (the common denominator)
is not present (on the screen) in the semantic coherence task.
Successful performance in the semantic coherence task thus
requires letting the attention move away in order to integrate
and finally use activated associations in the following judgment.
Unlike the detection of an object within the blurred picture,
this processing sequence may be assigned the extension memory
(Kuhl, 2000), a system that fosters the integration of single
elements (DEEP SALT FOAM) into a coherent whole (SEA)
via high-level intuitive holistic processing sequences and it is
connected to the integrated self. Thus, in line with the theoretical
assumptions in the foregoing, this extended memory system
including the parallel-holistic, flexible processing sequences that
it relies on seems to be impaired during depression.
Finally, yet importantly, the findings of enhanced visual
coherence judgments during depression may further be
embedded into research showing that negative mood – in
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general – fosters detail-oriented and early visual processing
(Bocanegra and Zeelenberg, 2009). For example, Phelps et al.
(2006) found that participants’ contrast sensitivity is enhanced
after viewing fearful faces. Furthermore, negative affective states
have been shown to foster spatial working memory capacities
whereas they impair verbal working memory capacities (Gray,
2001; Storbeck, 2012).
Concluding, a fine-grained analysis of stimulus features as well
as of cognitive and emotional processes required for successful
task performance can help to understand in how far different
tasks eventually measure the same or distinct outcomes and
how different task characteristics interact with psychological
processes. From the current evidence, it may be concluded that
depressed individuals have impairments in intuitions that rely
on flexible, associative processes of semantic spread, but that
depression might have no or even a beneficial effect on visual
processes and visual gestalt perception. If these findings were
consolidated in future studies, important practical implications
may be concluded. For example, in therapeutic interventions it
may be considered that depressed individuals have difficulties to
recur on holistic semantic associations when solving problems.
Supporting therapy sessions with visually based material, may
thus be helpful in supporting patients to see the bigger picture and
integrate information in a holistic manner.
However, for the moment, we think that conclusions should
be drawn with care as the empirical basis is not sufficiently
robust. Even though current findings suggest that in some
instances intuitions are enhanced in depression whereas in
others they are impaired, we think that a definitive conclusion
would be premature. For example, we cannot conclude from the
current studies whether impairments in other faculties such as
analytical processes have influenced the operation of intuitive
processes in the current studies. Upcoming research would do
well in examining the interplay between intuitive processes
and rational-analytic processes that may also be impaired
and biased in depression (Beevers, 2005). In addition, future
research should first of all elucidate the construct validity of
the intuition tasks. Moreover, it should be examined to what
extent the operationalization of intuition used in the former
studies is related to depressed individuals’ decision-making styles
in daily life. On the basis of these considerations, we will
outline suggestions of future research that seeks to further
elucidate the interplay between intuition and depression in the
following.
DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
Which Mechanisms Underlie Intuitive
Decision-Making in Depression?
The investigation of intuition and depression is still in an early
phase. Concluding from current findings it seems important
that future research first of all elucidates whether different
intuition tasks effectively measure the same psychological
phenomena. Furthermore, from the perspective of a continuous
conceptualization of intuition (Bowers et al., 1990), future
research should explore at what stage within the intuition
generation process impairments occur. First, it should be
explored whether the underlying process of semantic spreading
activation is impaired in depression or whether this is intact,
which would become obvious in successful performance in
semantic priming tasks (see Topolinski and Strack, 2009a,c). In
a next step it should be examined whether the impairment in
intuitive performance is attributable to patients’ low confidence
in their intuitive hunches (see for example Rolison et al., in press
for a study on the effects of anxiety and reduced confidence on
decision-making). If underlying processes of activation spread
were shown to be intact in depression, and intuitive performance
deficits mostly stem from low confidence levels, this would
have important implications for therapeutic interventions that
may consequently be directed to enhance patients’ trust in their
intuitive capacities. Moreover, it should be explored whether
activation spread is negatively biased in depression. This could be
examined by using affectively laden word triads. One assumption
may be that negative word triads are processed more fluently in
depression, which would result in better intuitive accuracy for
negative stimuli compared to positive stimuli (see Topolinski and
Strack, 2009a for stimulus pool).
It should further be explored whether intuition deficits in
depression are related to the diminished ability of depressed
individuals to experience positive affect (Heller et al., 2009;
Joormann and Vanderlind, 2014). This would be important to
study as intuitive hunches have shown to be accompanied by
subtle positive affective changes (Topolinski and Strack, 2009a,b)
and intuitive decision-making itself is boosted by emotional
information (Bolte et al., 2003; Lufityanto et al., 2016). Along
this line, a recent study has found that especially people with
affect regulation difficulties benefit from positive mood when
taking intuitive decisions (Maldei and Baumann, 2015). However,
depressed individuals may have problems to make use or even
experience these positive affective cues needed for intuitive
decisions. In other words, whereas in healthy people intuitive
decisions just feel right, depressed patients may lack the ability to
experience such positive feelings of coherence. This in turn may
lead to less favorable decisions or no decision at all. Investigating
these ideas would provide important insights on why depressed
individuals struggle to come to decisions that feel right.
Moreover, future investigations would do well in assessing
also effortful, analytical decision-making capacities of depressed
patients. It would be of interest to examine how impairments
in one capacity influences the other. For example, it should be
explored whether intuitive processes are related to limitations in
reasoning or working memory capacities. In addition, it should
be explored to what extent the generation of irrelevant thoughts
or ruminative processes impair intuitive decision-making, as for
deliberate reasoning it has been shown that irrelevant thoughts
elicited by negative mood impair performance (Perham and
Rosser, 2012). In addition to these ideas, it would be interesting
to investigate in future studies which neurophysiological impact
antidepressants exhibit on unconscious processes of coherence
detection. Altogether, there is a set of research questions resulting
from the current empirical evidence on intuition in depression
that are specific to the experimental tasks used in former studies
(Remmers et al., 2015a; Remmers et al., 2016a).
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Apart from these specific issues that concern well-established
intuition measures such as the visual and semantic coherence
tasks, upcoming research should further continue to explore
intuitive capacities in depression by using measures that tap
into other facets of intuition (Sinclair, 2011). For example,
investigating intuitions based on stimuli that are more self-
relevant may be especially important in order to increase
ecological validity of empirical findings (Lieberman et al.,
2004). This line of research would take into account that
intuition is highly influenced by experience as it is ‘nothing
more and nothing less than recognition’ (Kahneman and
Klein, 2009, p. 520). Thus, even though intuitions are inter-
individually comparable in terms of the processes they are
based on (i.e., associative, unconscious, fast) people can differ
regarding the content of these processes and the products
that results from them. It thus becomes evident that some
intuitions, such as semantic coherence intuitions assessed with
the semantic coherence task are inter-individually comparable
(most participants would agree that SEA SALT FOAM are
all semantically connected to SEA) whereas others are largely
idiosyncratic as persons may differ in their associative network
and memory contents that are activated in certain situations
(Lieberman, 2000; Lieberman et al., 2004). In line with this,
evidence from neurophysiological research found distinct brain
activation patterns for self-representations that are based on
intuition (Lieberman et al., 2004). Biases in this domain would
provide important insight, especially because intuition-based
self-presentations are likely to change slowly and are relatively
insensitive explicit feedback from others (Lieberman et al., 2004).
Moreover, using more self-relevant stimuli for intuitive decision-
making is important because we do not know to what extent
intuition assessed with experimental paradigms such as the
semantic coherence task relate to daily life intuitive decision-
making.
Along this line, it would be of interest to differentiate between
low-level and high-level intuitive processing suggested by PSI
theory (Kuhl, 2000). Future research would do well in elucidating
how low-level intuitive processing sequences that are related to
automatized behavioral programs and that help to put plans into
action are affected by depression. Moreover, and importantly, it
would be of interest to examine how the activation or inhibition
of self-regulatory systems such as the extension memory and
intuitive behavior control system interact with each other within
depressed patients and to what degree they play a role in
predicting the onset of depressive episodes.
Investigating Real-Life Decision-Making
Investigations that track idiosyncratic decision-making profiles of
depressives or vulnerable subjects would help to understand how
subjects decide when facing major or minor daily life decisions
such as whether to accept a job offer or whether to go out meeting
friends. Do they go with their intuition? Or do they reflect
analytically about these issues? Do depressed individuals have
decision difficulties in complex situations in which intuitions
may help? Or does indecisiveness also occur for rather simple
decisions, in which no high loads of information has to be
integrated? To answer these questions, experience sampling
methods may constitute a usable option as they can assess
decision-making modes more directly by prompting subjects to
render reports many times a day (Larson and Csikszentmihalyi,
1983; Hektner et al., 2006). Future studies could hereby also
investigate in which decision-making areas (work, relationship,
leisure time, health) patients report more or less difficulties. In
a nutshell, to obtain a more precise picture of how individuals
suffering from depression decide in daily life would inform our
understanding of decision-making difficulties and may broaden
our understanding regarding intuition in depression.
Another method that may be used for this thrust are
retrospective reports assessed via interviews or survey
questionnaires (Klein, 1998; Dane and Pratt, 2009). These
methods allow participants to describe how they approached
a decision-making problem and researchers to assess factors
such as the complexity of the problem and the mood state
prior and after the decision taken. Retrospective reports may
further inform us when individuals with depression tend to take
functional or dysfunctional decisions and whether the decision
was grounded on intuitive or rational processes or both. It should
be noted, however, that despite the advantage of high ecological
validity retrospective reports are limited in terms of accuracy.
For researchers it would be difficult to control whether decisions
were actually made intuitively (see Dane and Pratt, 2009 for a
discussion on this).
Last but not least, research should examine the etiological
role of high-level intuitive capacities. For example, from
a clinical perspective it would be of interest to explore
whether the impairment in intuitive capacities in specific
and decision-difficulties more generally remain after remission.
Additionally, the question arises whether vulnerable individuals
are less intuitive even before depression breaks out. Therefore,
longitudinal designs may be advisable for future research.
Are there Maladaptive Intuitions in
Depression?
In the foregoing, we have considered research and experimental
paradigms in which intuition is conceptualized as an adaptive
capacity that allows fast coherence detection as well as quick
and effortless decision-making (Gigerenzer, 2007; Klein, 2008).
For the purpose of a clear demarcation and operationalization
of this construct in future research and theorizing in clinical
psychology, it would be important to examine intuition and
its relation to other depression-related cognitive phenomena.
Emotional reasoning, for example, describes the phenomenon to
conclude from an emotional reaction that something is proven
or true (Beck et al., 1979). It guides decisions and judgments
and resembles intuition on a phenomenological level but also
regarding the processes it is based on. Both intuition and
emotional reasoning have in common that they are influenced by
affect, appear automatically and are experienced as self-evident.
The risk to confound intuition with other cognitive
phenomena will be illustrated in the following example.
Imagine a woman walks down a street and sees two friends
sitting in a coffee place. Without thinking about the situation,
the woman has the immediate hunch to walk by the café trying
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to stay unseen. On the one hand one may argue, that this is no
example of intuition because the underlying processes were not
operating holistically. Using her intuition, the woman would
have seen the bigger picture. She would have integrated implicit
goals and wishes (e.g., the need to interact with other people) into
her decision. Moreover, more positive associations regarding
those two friends would have been taken into account (Kuhl
et al., 2015). This, in turn, may have resulted in the intuitive
decision to join the friends. Thus, the reaction of the woman may
be interpreted as product resulting from an emotional reasoning
process. The current mood state might have influenced the
way information was processed (Klein, 1998; Hogarth, 2001;
Kahneman and Klein, 2009) and served as evidence for the
correctness of the decision (‘it does not feel good to join them,
therefore I will not join them’; Schwarz, 2002). Thus, from this
perspective, the decision rather reflects an automatic decision
that followed from emotional reasoning and from the activation
of subconscious negative schemes. The access to otherwise
adaptive intuitions was, from this point of view, impaired in this
example. However, the argument that this was indeed an example
of intuition, showing that intuitive decisions and judgments
may be biased and flawed is also conceivable. Therefore, future
research would do well in disentangling intuition from other
emotion- and experience-driven processes influencing decisions
and judgments.
Apart from these delimitation problems, it appears to be an
important step for future research to examine to what extent
intuitions in depressed patients may be influenced by negative
distortions and imprints of the implicit memory structure. Along
this line, current dual-process models of depression (Beevers,
2005) assume that cognitive vulnerability to depression stems
from biased associative, implicit processing (Beevers, 2005; but
also see Teachman et al., 2012). Importantly, it is claimed
that whenever biased self-referent associative processing remains
uncorrected (e.g., when cognitive resources are not available to
engage reflective correcting processing) cognitive vulnerability
to depression is given (Beevers, 2005). Thus, the question arises
whether intuitions may become dysfunctional or unrealistic
when they result from biased underlying implicit memory.
As biases in implicit memory have mostly been shown in
the semantic domain (Watkins, 2002) and especially intuitions
based on semantic networks seem to be impaired in depression
(Remmers et al., 2015a, 2016a), investigations that connect these
two lines of research (e.g., how do implicit memory biases
influence intuition?) seem very promising.
IMPLICATIONS FOR CLINICAL
TREATMENT
It is clear from the foregoing that intuitions influence people’s
decisions and subsequent actions. On the one hand, the problem
in depression may be that patients do not use functional
intuitions stemming from holistic information processing (see
Kuhl, 2000, 2001). A consequence of this may be that they have
difficulties to come to decisions that integrate great amounts
of information and reconcile different aspects of the self. Being
unable to use these kinds of intuitions may further result in
actions and behaviors that are inconsistent with needs, wishes
and goals. Moreover, decisions that result from a rather non-
integrative process may be experienced as dissatisfying and
alienating (see Baumann and Kuhl, 2003). On the other hand,
negative self-schemes and dysfunctional core beliefs may not
only stabilize depressive symptomatology but may also nourish
the development of dysfunctional intuitions (Beevers, 2005).
Even though, this latter assumption still needs examination, we
tentatively conclude that gaining access to intuitions may be
an important practical implication from the current theorizing.
From a practical point of view, establishing awareness of intuitive
hunches seems important because this would enable individuals
to differentiate between those intuitions that are functional and
that may be acted upon and those intuitions that should be
dismissed or corrected as they might lead to dysfunctional and
depressogenic actions (Shapiro and Spence, 1997; Beevers, 2005).
This idea is in line with Kahneman and Klein (2009) positing that
‘when there are cues that an intuitive judgment could be wrong,
System 2 [rational-analytic processes] can impose a different
strategy, replacing intuition by careful reasoning’ (p. 519). In
other words, from a practical point of view, it may be advisable
to get aware of and examine intuitions before acting upon or
dismissing them.
From a clinical and practical perspective, the question how
such awareness of intuitions may be enhanced directly follows.
Interestingly it strikes out that the wisdom that lies within the
every-day expression of ‘go with your gut’ corresponds to a widely
established therapeutic conception stating that ‘listening’ to inner
voices and to the body may be helpful when we are trying to
understand what we need or when we are trying to change what
makes us suffer. Along this line, investigations within the scope
of embodiment research (Niedenthal, 2007) have shown that the
association between the body and cognitive-affective responses
is bidirectional. It has further been shown that the degree to
which individuals are able to correctly perceive body signals
(interoception) influences intuitive decision-making (Damasio,
1994; Dunn et al., 2010). Thus, it may be concluded that it is an
important capacity to know which signal (bodily, intuitive) may
be trusted and which should be dismissed.
One approach that stresses this aspect of careful listening to
bodily experiences is the Focusing method introduced by Gendlin
(1981). The main premise is that Focusing helps patients to get
in touch with the felt-sense. The felt sense entails pre-verbal
knowledge about ‘something,’ such as what one needs or wants
and it may be accessed through the body. The felt sense is not an
emotion or a mood state and it entails an implicit complexity. By
getting in touch with the felt sense, patients may become more
aware of what a difficult situation or a pending decision evokes
and they may then gently explore this bodily felt experience and
its meaning. In the next step they are encouraged to find a word,
phrase, or picture for the bodily felt experience and to examine,
whether this word or phrase matches with the not-yet-articulated
knowing. If the verbal representation matches with the feeling,
the bodily experience generally changes which may be called a
felt shift. This alteration in the felt-sense may be a result of the
preceding process of intuiting and careful examining. As such,
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the felt sense may be understood as a ‘holistic, implicit, bodily
sense of a complex situation’ (Gendlin, 1996, pp. 20) which goes
beyond intellectual reflections of a problem.
Another approach by which access to intuitions may be
gained via the body is mindfulness. In mindfulness exercises
individuals learn to, listen to sensations in the here-and-now
in a non-defensive, non-reactive way. Based on the definition
of mindfulness as a form of attention that focuses on present
feelings, thoughts and bodily sensations (Kabat-Zinn, 1990),
we tested the assumption that mindfulness also enhances
access to intuitive responses in one of our own investigations
(Remmers et al., 2015b). After a sad mood induction, healthy
participants (N = 94) were randomly assigned to perform either
a mindfulness, distraction or rumination exercise. To assess
the effect of the respective exercise on intuition, participants
then performed the semantic coherence task. Even though
mindfulness was successful in down-regulating negative mood, it
did not have any impact on the task performance (see Remmers
et al., 2015b for a detailed discussion). In addition, it was found
that self-reported levels of trait mindfulness, assessed with the
Kentucky Inventory of Mindfulness Skills (Baer et al., 2004), were
negatively associated with the intuitive performance. As such, the
hypothesis was not supported and results even pointed to the
opposite direction.
A number of methodological aspects may explain this pattern
of findings. For example, the intuition task requires participants
to decide and judge instantly. This in turn may stand in
contrast to a facet of mindfulness that requires individuals
to adopt a non-reactive, non-judgmental, observing attitude.
Indeed, results in Remmers et al. (2015b) revealed that the overall
negative correlation between trait mindfulness and intuitive
accuracy was driven by a strong negative correlation between the
acting without judgment subscale and the intuitive performance.
Furthermore, the sample consisted of subjects who were naïve in
mindfulness practice and it has been shown that the degree of
mindfulness experience may explain differential effects of trait
mindfulness on cognitive tasks (Jha et al., 2007). For example,
mindfulness novices train to narrow their attentional focus
(attention to the breath) whereas experienced meditators widen
their attentional field (Jha et al., 2007). Thus, the low mindfulness
experience of the sample may have influenced the pattern of
findings in the study of Remmers et al. (2015b).
Another approach that may foster access to intuitive processes
is psychodynamic psychotherapy (Shedler, 2010). This approach
stems from psychoanalysis of which the central goal was
according to Freud (1916/1917) to get access to implicit or
unconscious representations and experiences. In line with this,
a key focus of psychodynamic treatment is to enhance patients’
access to initially non-conscious knowledge about the self (Hayes
et al., 1996). Therefore, it may be concluded that also intuitions
are accessed more easily as a consequence of psychodynamic
treatment. However, of course the exact relationship between
unconscious processes, as defined in psychoanalysis, and
intuition as investigated with the experimental paradigms
described above has to be determined.
More generally, all treatments mentioned above seem to
cultivate a form of self-focus that retains the advantages of self-
knowledge (Watkins and Teasdale, 2004, p. 6; see also Kuhl,
2000). As such, it may be assumed that directing attention toward
oneself is helpful when being done in a more adaptive manner
than during rumination (Watkins and Teasdale, 2004). In such
instances, it may enable individuals not to think about inner
experiences but to get aware of the (self in the) present moment
in an intuitive, experiential way (see Watkins and Teasdale, 2004,
p. 2). Approaches that foster this kind of experiential self-focus
(e.g., the different humanistic-experiential approaches; see Elliott
et al., 2013) may create the basic requirements for the access
to intuitions. Furthermore, it may be suspected that individuals
who have access to intuitions may become aware of subtle
conflicts between formerly unconscious, intuitive responses, and
conscious elaborations. Resolving such conflicts or discrepancies
between intuitive and rational responses may thus be another
adaptive consequence of gaining access to intuitions. Indeed, for
mindfulness it has been shown in a number of studies that one
means by which mindfulness exhibits its beneficial effects is by
enhancing the alignment between implicit and explicit responses
(Brown and Ryan, 2003; Koole et al., 2009; Crescentini and
Capurso, 2015; Remmers et al., 2016b).
As a conclusion, we would like state that intuitions have an
impact on what we decide and do and how we subsequently feel.
Thus, addressing the question how intuitive decision-making
operates during psychopathological states such as depression is
an important thrust for science and practice. In the long run,
this line of work may help depressed individuals to take adaptive
decisions and to find a way out of indecisiveness.
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